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Abstract
In this paper, we consider whether brokerage in an intra-
organizational communication network and type of work role interact 
to predict individual performance in a professional organization. The 
independent–interdependent nature of work roles is considered a 
key factor in structural contingency theory, but is yet to be studied 
in relation to brokerage. We propose that a brokerage position has 
a joint effect on performance along with work role in a study of 
organization-wide communication network in an architectural firm 
with 65 employees. Our analysis suggests an association between 
brokerage and role-prescribed performance for individuals in both 
interdependent and independent types of work roles. Our findings 
also suggest that interdependent roles requiring broad, organization-
wide collaboration, and communication with others, brokerage is 
positively associated with the performance prescribed by the role, 
but for independent roles, wherein collaboration and communication 
are somewhat limited by the formal role, brokerage has far less of 
an effect. Our findings contribute to brokerage theory by comparing 
how brokerage affects performance in two distinct work roles by 
illustrating how the benefits of brokerage seem more restricted to 
those in interdependent work roles. The contribution of this paper is 
to suggest the independent–interdependent nature of work role as a 
boundary condition for brokerage.
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Brokerage theory is probably one of the most 
influential lines of thought in network theory. Since 
Burt’s (1992) seminal book, brokerage has been 
studied and associated with numerous organizational 
advantages for an individual, such as higher salary 
and faster promotion, based on the benefits of having 
better access to information and greater control over 
other actors than their more socially constrained 
colleagues (Burt, 2004). While brokerage generally 
provides benefits, some studies have found that under 
context-specific conditions, there may not always be 
positive effects (e.g. Barnes et al., 2016; Burt, 1998; 
Fleming et al., 2007). Therefore, as the empirical 
results are mixed, the contingencies and boundary 
conditions for brokerage merit further research.
An important, but generally overlooked boundary 
condition in structural network analysis is the independ-
ent–interdependent nature of work roles, even though 
interdependency has been widely used as a modera-
tor in general management studies and is at the core of 
structural contingency theory (Thompson, 1967). Inter-
dependence regulates how much ind ividuals can com-
municate and collaborate with others to perform their 
work effectively (Cummings, 1978; Wang et al., 2019), 
and is one of the most important factors influencing 
team performance in organizations (Langfred, 2005; 
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Saavedra et al., 1993). In structural contingency the-
ory, numerous dimensions of interdependence, such 
as pooled, sequential, or reciprocal types, have been 
distinguished based on exchange of information or re-
sources (Thompson, 1967).
This empirical study considered how the benefits 
of brokerage are contingent on the independent–
interdependent nature of the work role. That is, how 
the informal organization, operationalized as the intra-
organizational communication network structure, 
corresponds with the formal work role for performance. 
The novelty and value in this approach is that when 
the formal and informal organizations have been 
linked to performance outcomes as such, their effects 
on each other have not been linked so often in the 
literature (McEvily et al., 2014). Following the structural 
contingency theory logic to test the formal work role’s 
effect as a boundary condition for brokerage, our paper 
explores whether work role moderates brokerage effect 
on performance in professional organizations.
Drawing from the nature of work at our case 
architectural firm, our hypothesis is developed on the 
starting point that work in a professional organization 
is generally anchored on either independent or interde-
pendent tasks and work roles are formed accordingly. 
Both independent and interdependent roles prompt 
role-prescribed performance expectations due to the 
division of labor: professionals typically work in inte-
llectually demanding projects, requiring them to focus 
their energy on the highly demanding ope rative work, 
simultaneously creating demand for interdependent 
roles to manage the projects and the supporting 
organizations (cf. Etzioni, 1964; Weber, 1982). Thus, the 
formal work role not only limits interdependence for the 
professionals, but also assumes managers to adopt the 
interdependent role to communicate and collaborate 
broadly across the organization. In this paper, we 
hypothesize that when brokerage and role-prescribed 
performance are aligned, individuals perform best.
Our data are derived from a communication 
network study of an architectural firm of 93 
employees, of which 65 were classified as working 
mainly in either independent (n = 31) or interdependent 
(n = 34) roles. We chose to study this specific 
architectural firm as a typical professional organization 
because the firm had clearly distinguished work 
roles for the independent professional architects 
and interdependent managers1. In our analysis, we 
examined the moderating effect of work role in the 
association between brokerage and role-specific 
individual performance. Role-specific performance 
involved an objective measure of either billable hours 
for the professional architects (i.e. independent work 
role) or a peer evaluation score of managers as 
promoter of ideas (i.e. interdependent work role).
Our study contributes to the underlying assump-
tions about the effects of brokerage. Despite a few 
negative reports from the literature (e.g. Barnes 
et al., 2016; Fleming et al., 2007), the general 
understanding about brokerage is that it benefits the 
individual in most circumstances. In this regard, our 
study contributes to brokerage theory by pointing 
out an important contingency of work role. In 
practical terms, our findings imply that independent 
professionals, such as architects, do not seem to 
benefit so much from networking and bridge building, 
since these are less related to their role-prescribed 
performance. In the context of management theory, 
our study contributes to a better understanding of 
the interplay of formal and informal organizations. 
These two topics have historically remained separate 
and unconnected (McEvily et al., 2014) but have 
spurred number of integrative studies (Biancani et al., 
2014; Kleinbaum et al., 2013; Soda and Zaheer, 
2012; Srivastava, 2015). By treating work role as 
a moderator in molding the association between 
brokerage and performance, we address the gap 
in the literature on the topic by extending structural 
network analysis with contingencies (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002; Carnabuci and Oszegi, 2015; Cross and 
Cummings, 2004; Hansen, 1999; Mehra et al., 2001). 
By doing this, we increase the explanatory power 
of structural analysis (Lincoln, 1990; cf. Lincoln and 
Miller, 1979), resulting as an increased knowledge of 
how informal network position is associated with role-
prescribed performance.
Contingent effect of work role on 
the relationship between brokerage 
and performance
The basic tenet of our study is that there are, on the 
whole, fundamental differences in the communication 
and cooperation requirements between independent 
and interdependent work roles. According to classi-
cal management theory, work roles outline a kind of 
bureaucratic boundary for social relationships that 
individuals can and should adhere to and engage 
in within their organization – when an individual is 
assigned a certain role, then the communication 
network becomes somewhat inherited and defined 
1The organization’s work role structures and innovation ac-
tivities were studied extensively at two-year research project 
with 13 theme-based interviews and several workshops. 
The results are reported at a PhD thesis (Tuominen, 2013).
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by the role (Hansen and Haas, 2001; Lincoln and 
Miller, 1979; McEvily et al., 2014; Merton, 1939; 
Weber, 1982). Over time, individuals develop informal 
networks largely corresponding the role-prescribed 
relationships (Lincoln and Miller, 1979; Padgett 
and Ansell, 1993), but the networks reach beyond 
the formal bureaucratic boundaries as individuals 
communicate freely across the organization 
(Krackhardt, 1994).
In addition to communication, formal division of 
labor and corresponding roles also affect expected 
performance. Previous research has noted that 
a work role defines what types of activities an 
individual performs, prompts normative expectations 
in an organization, and sets the standard for how 
performance is evaluated (Biddle, 1986; Katz and 
Kahn, 1978; Welbourne et al., 1998). In the most 
extreme cases, performance that is not prescribed 
by the work role is prohibited and only the type of 
performance established for the role is rewarded 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1975). Conceivably because 
performance expectations are strongly determined 
by the work role, a notable body of research studies 
specifically considers work role performance, and the 
conditions to manage and maximize it (Griffin et al., 
2007; Leroy et al., 2015).
Work roles having a contingent effect on the 
relationship between brokerage and performance 
can be analyzed using structural contingency theory 
combined with the conception of organization as a 
socio-technical system. As a socio-technical system, 
professional organization is a combination of social, 
interpersonal communication networks, and technical 
roles specified by the formal division of labor, 
wherein the formal aspects interact with the social 
aspects of performance (Cummings, 1978). From 
this perspective, work role is derived from technology 
and corresponds with Thompson’s (1967) pooled 
task interdependence for independent work and 
reciprocal task interdependence for interdependent 
work. In the former category, rules and standard 
procedures provide enough coordination for the 
individuals and teams to work independently 
toward a common goal, and in the latter category, 
the coordination mechanism involves a mutual 
adjustment, as the work is performed together to 
produce the output. Specifically, the independent–
interdependent nature of work has been a key focus 
of research related to team performance (Cummings, 
1978; Langfred, 2005; Wang et al., 2019). In these 
studies, interdependence is built-in to the work the 
team performs, and then treated as a moderator of 
aspects such as group autonomy, collective efficacy, 
group potency, organizational citizenship or diversity 
for several different types of outcomes (Bachrach 
et al., 2006; Langfred, 2000, 2005; Stajkovic et al., 
2009; Wang et al., 2019).
Notable in the results of these studies is 
the support for the mechanisms derived from 
Thompson’s (1967) theory that demonstrate that the 
need for communication and cooperation increases 
along with an increase in the task interdependency, 
complexity of goals and feedback (Saavedra et al., 
1993). In professional organizations, these dimensions 
become increasingly complex amid higher positions 
in formal hierarchy simply because managers tend 
to have increasingly broader job descriptions than 
their subordinates and participate in a larger number 
of overlapping projects of various kinds. Typically, 
managers are experienced professionals in their 
field, and they perform some of the client project 
work in addition to fulfilling the expectations toward 
sales, organizational development and coordinating 
activities in their departments or other work units 
(e.g. Etzioni, 1964). A manager’s goals are in this 
respect defined from both above and below their 
hierarchical position, and they receive feedback 
for their work from several others aside from their 
immediate colleagues. In contrast, professionals are 
technical specialists, and performing their job well 
generally requires spending more time at their desks 
working on specific projects, thus having inherently 
higher independence incorporated in their work 
roles, even if their project may require combining 
several individual’s work. Table 1 summarizes 
how professionals and managers differ in terms of 
interdependency based on the dimensions identified 
by Saavedra et al. (1993).
A brokerage position in a communication network 
of interdependent work roles can provide a major 
boost to effective communication and cooperation. 
Studies show that brokerage provides the best 
position to coordinate work across other areas 
of a work communication network (Burt, 1992; 
Granovetter, 1973) and increases the ability to 
convey ideas across the organization to the distant 
individuals in the network (Reagans and McEvily, 
2003). Brokerage also increases the chances 
that an individual’s activities are to be considered 
and engaged by others, and concomitantly, to be 
judged valuable (Burt, 2004). In general, brokerage 
means less structural constraint, more diversity, and 
weaker ties (Aral and Van Alstyne, 2011), and allows 
individuals to benefit from non-redundant sources of 
knowledge (Hansen, 1999). The more interdependent 
the work role is, the greater the need for brokerage in 
a professional organization. Our hypothesis evaluates 
how brokerage in the communication network and 
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independent–interdependent work roles interact with 
each other:
H1. Work role moderates the relationship between 
brokerage and role-prescribed performance 
such that the contribution of brokerage is 
stronger when the work role is interdependent 
compared to independent.
Methods
Data
We tested our hypotheses using data collected in an 
architectural firm during a two-year study. We collected 
questionnaire and timesheet data from employees 
who participated in client projects residing in the same 
open office and who were employed during the first 
and second years of the study (n = 65). To control 
for common method variance and develop a causal 
argument on the network positions and performance, 
the data on dependent variables were collected in the 
second year of the study from time sheets and from 
an additional online survey. In total, there were 93 
employees at the start of the study and the remaining 
28 employees worked at other physical locations, left 
the company or belonged to administrative staff (e.g. 
information system administration and payroll). There 
were five formal roles: professionals, project managers, 
senior project managers, and managing partners. The 
professional architects were coded as independent 
roles (n = 31) and all manager roles were coded as 
interdependent roles (n = 34). The professionals 
performed different aspects of design and drawings, 
and managers attended to sales, project management, 
and development.
Based on 13 interviews about work roles and 
innovative activities at the case company reported 
by Tuominen (2013), the professionals were clearly a 
distinct group from the managers and were allowed 
to focus mainly on their solitary architectural design 
work. Conversely, managers were given broad 
responsibilities in managing work units and engaged 
in development and innovation. The case firm invested 
heavily in innovation and development and just before 
the beginning of our data collection, promoted 
several individuals previously working as professional 
architects to project managers. Both work roles 
required talent and extensive training in architectural 
design, but they differed in communication patterns, 
the managers have to communicate across the firm 
to participate in and supervise several development 
projects. A total of 33% of the sample were women, 
and 83% had a master’s degree in architecture, which 
Table 1. Differences between independent and interdependent work roles in a 
professional organization.
Independent roles in a 
professional organization
Interdependent roles in a 
professional organization
Typical formal role Professional Manager
Task interdependency Client projects of several sequential 
and parallel tasks to be worked on 
alone and coordinated within the 
project team
Supervision over work units, selling, 
negotiating, and participating in several client 
projects. Member of business development 
and strategy development teams
Goal interdependency Client project provides clear 
goals for each individual and for 
compiled output of project
Several goals coming from projects, firm, 
and clients
Feedback interdependency Individuals receive feedback 
from colleagues working on the 
same project. Collective feedback 
provided by superior and client 
during and after project
Feedback from the subordinates, from 
clients and from top management. 
Feedback from several projects
Requirements for collaboration 
and coordination
Lower Higher
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is minimal required training for certified architects. 
The remaining 17% had a bachelor’s degree or 
vocational degree in related design field. The average 
tenure was 9.25 years (SD = 6.83) for managers and 
5.17 years (SD = 4.89) for professionals.
Measures
Dependent variables
We used billable hours from clients as a dependent 
variable of the role-prescribed performance for 
the independent work roles. This was constructed 
based on time sheets, where the employees had 
allocated their working time in a variety of categories. 
We chose billable hours from the client category 
as a performance measure of independent work 
roles, because the firm aimed at maximizing it, and 
it was directly linked to annual profit. We calculated 
a monthly mean of the number of billable hours to 
generate a uniform variable to describe individuals’ 
average performance through the year. Monthly 
mean billable hours for interdependent roles were 
94.76 (SD = 38.04) and for independent roles 114.16 
(SD = 22.27). The variable was normalized with second 
power transformation to adjust its skew.
For the variable describing role-prescribed 
performance for interdependent work roles, we 
chose promoting of new ideas. Following the survey 
examples from Wasserman and Faust (1994), the 
variable was constructed from a questionnaire 
in which the respondent was asked to name five 
individuals in the firm who promote new ideas. 
Each nomination received one point, and points 
were summed resulting in a count variable of 
interdependent work roles’ performance. This 
procedure was chosen, because it provides a 
single component measure of a person’s perceived 
competence and ability to put forth actions in the 
organization that will eventually lead to innovation 
(March, 1991). This measure also corresponds with 
the current understanding of creativity that highlights 
the generation of both novel and useful ideas 
(Amabile, 1996) and provides a measure to identify 
those individuals who are both coming up with ideas 
and promoting them. The variable was normalized 
with square root transformation to adjust its skew.
Independent variables
The network data consisted of information on 
self-reported social ties in three types of work-
related communication collected through an online 
sociometric survey instrument in the first year of study. 
Preliminary interviews consistently identified three 
types of informal, work-related interaction among 
employees that we distinguished in our survey: 
communication about the (i) day-to-day architectural 
design work, (ii) innovative new ideas, and (iii) business 
development. The network data were obtained from a 
free-choice survey with two-way directed questions, 
wherein giving-information-to and getting-information-
from components of communication were asked 
separately (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Thus, three 
network survey question pairs were used: one for 
communication about the day-to-day architectural 
design work, one for innovative new ideas, and one for 
business development.
The wording of the questions were tailored to 
reflect the conditions of the company based on 
the interviews, and were checked with one of the 
supervisors before publishing the survey online. A 
one-sentence example was given in all three types 
of communication. Communication about the day-to-
day architectural design work was defined as relating 
to the output delivered to clients that was recurring 
and was in the realm of respondent’s line of expertise. 
Communication for innovative new ideas was defined 
as work-related ideas that the respondent was not 
aware of anyone else proposing previously. Business 
development communication was defined as com-
munication about improvements in pre-existing 
products or services, or internal company process or 
personal work practices. The response rate was 90% 
for the questions about communication in day-to-day 
architectural design work and business development 
tasks and 84% in communicating innovative new 
ideas.
In the online survey, the network questions were 
presented after a filtering question wherein the 
employees had defined their own acquaintances 
from a roster of all employee names. Small 
organization size permitted a full roster method, 
which rules out recall bias thus increasing reliability 
of the network measures (Marsden, 2011). Separating 
giving-and-getting components of communication 
further increases psychometric reliability by allowing 
confirmation of each social tie (Krackhardt, 1990). 
The frequency scale in communication was set to 
choices of (4) daily, (3) weekly, (2) once a month, (1) 
less than once a month, or (0) = not at all.
We transposed the getting-information-from 
component in each of network question pairs, and 
joined the resulting two networks together, by using 
the value of the giving-information component as 
communication frequency resulting in confirmed 
communication ties between individuals. Before 
generating the brokerage measures, we combined 
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the three networks by summing up the frequencies, 
then dichotomizing at the mean frequency (MIN = 1, 
MAX = 12, MEAN = 3.411, SD = 2.47).
Brokerage
Our first brokerage measure was the additive inverse 
of Burt’s constraint (Burt, 1992). First, we generated 
Burt’s constraint with Ucinet VI structural holes routine 
limiting the measure to consider only an individual’s 
contacts’ ties and using both outgoing and incoming 
ties. Then we generated our brokerage measure 
by calculating 1 minus constraint, following recent 
network studies (Carnabuci and Oszegi, 2015; Soda 
et al., 2019). Thus, the higher the resulting brokerage 
measure is, the more brokering opportunities the 
individual has. In other words, our measure indicates 
how an individual’s communication is concentrated 
in non-redundant contacts in groups of connected 
colleagues, because the less constrained actors are 
connected to more groups of others (Burt, 1992). In 
our analysis, the higher the additive inverse of Burt’s 
constraint, the better opportunities for brokerage the 
individual has. As the second brokerage measure, 
we used Betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977) 
generated with Stata function “nwcommands”. We 
added Betweenness centrality to the measures, 
because it has been frequently used as an additional 
brokerage measure (e.g. Fang et al., 2015).
Independent work role
We created a dummy variable to distinguish between 
independent and interdependent roles. All individuals 
in any of the manager roles (n = 34) were coded as 
interdependent (0) and all individuals in professional 
architect roles (n = 31) were coded as independent (1).
Control variables
We requested that the human resource manager 
of the company to provide us with demographic 
data of the employees. From that data, we created 
the control variables for organizational tenure, 
gender, and education to be used in our models 
because they were found to be significant in earlier 
studies of network positions and various outcome 
variables (Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Reagans and 
Zuckerman, 2001). Language skills and age were 
also considered in evaluating the modeling strategy, 
but these variables did not increase the explanatory 
power of the models and were dropped. Individuals 
were very homogeneous in terms of language skills, 
and age was highly correlated with tenure. There were 
six divisions in the firm specializing in certain types 
of architectural projects, for example, office buildings 
or shopping malls. We checked for an intraclass 
correlation (ICC) between the units to determine 
whether unit affiliation is a considerable source of 
variance in performance and did not find justification 
for hierarchical models.
Results
Table 2 presents bivariate correlations and descriptive 
statistics of the variables. Dependent variables and 
work role are numbered 1 to 3, followed by control 
variables and brokerage measures. We found 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations.
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Billable hours 103.88 32.89
2 Promoting new ideas 4.18 6.15 −0.56**
3 Independent work role 0.47 0.5 0.30* −0.41**
4 Tenure 7.37 6.31 −0.07 0.16 −0.32**
5 Female 0.33 0.48 0.13 −0.18 0.11 −0.13
6 Master’s degree 0.83 0.38 −0.06 0.2 −0.39** 0.08 −0.20
7 Inverse of Burt’s constraint 0.06 0.06 −0.19 0.41** −0.35** 0.25* −0.41** 0.06
8 Betweenness centrality 77.29 89.72 −0.32** 0.77** −0.27* 0.12 −0.25* 0.11 0.6**
Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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a positive correlation between both brokerage 
measures and idea promotion. The number of 
billable hours negative correlation is significant 
with betweenness centrality, but not with the 
inverse of Burt’s constraint. The independent role 
(i.e. 1 = independent, 0 = interdependent) correlates 
positively with the number of billable hours and 
negatively with idea promotion, which supports the 
assumption of distinct output expectations between 
the work roles. Having a master’s degree and 
tenure correlate negatively with independent work 
role, indicating that those in interdependent work 
roles have higher education and higher tenure than 
independent roles. Both brokerage measures are 
positively intercorrelated as expected.
We z-standardized all independent variables 
to facilitate better interpretation of the moderation 
effect as suggested by Dawson (2014). Tables 3 
and 4 present the results of the regression analyses 
testing the association between the inverse of Burt’s 
constraint, betweenness centrality, promoting new 
ideas, and billable hours. As postestimation of the 
models showed heteroscedasticity of the residuals 
caused by slight non-normality of the transformed 
dependent variables, we used robust standard errors 
to control for this, as suggested by Antonakis and 
Dietz (2011). OLS regression was chosen because it 
has been considered a valid modeling strategy when 
network measures are included as independent 
variables (e.g. Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Srivastava, 
2015). However, the network measures violate the 
independence of observations, which is one of the 
key assumptions of OLS regression resulting as 
underestimating of standard errors and over-rejecting 
of hypotheses (Srivastava, 2015). To correct this, we 
chose a procedure suggested by Borgatti et al. (2018) 
and compared the results of our conventional OLS 
models with those obtained from Ucinet VI node-
level regression, which uses the OLS regression to 
generate the coefficients, but permutation technique 
for the p-values. As both modeling techniques are 
presented side by side in Tables 3 and 4, it can be 
observed that the permutation technique generally 
results in higher t-values for those coefficients that are 
statistically significant, providing additional support 
for our results.
Our hypothesis about the work role’s boundary 
effect on brokerage means that brokerage is 
associated with higher work role-prescribed per-
formance, if the role is interdependent. In other 
words, as employees in interdependent work roles 
are expected to engage in promoting new ideas in 
the organization, they benefit from brokerage. To test 
this aspect of the hypothesis, we first examined the 
Table 3. Results of conventional and node-level OLS regression analysis for 
promoting new ideas (t-values in parentheses).
Promoting new ideas
Model 1 
conventional 
OLS
Model 2 
permutation 
OLS
Model 3 
conventional 
OLS
Model 4 
permutation 
OLS
Independent work role −0.54 (−1.62) −0.54 (−1.79) −0.82 (−3.08)** −0.82 (−3.25)**
Tenure 0.06 (0.45) 0.06 (0.50) 0.10 (0.79) 0.10 (0.91)
Female 0.34 (1.57) 0.34 (1.17) 0.22 (1.20) 0.22 (0.92)
Master’s degree 0.15 (0.60) 0.15 (0.41) 0.11 (0.52) 0.11 (0.35)
Inverse of Burt’s constraint 2.10 (3.47)** 2.10 (4.97)**
Independent × Inv. of Burt’s constraint −1.78 (−2.81)** −1.78 (−3.76)**
Betweenness centrality 0.86 (5.92)** 0.86 (7.22)**
Independent × Betweenness −0.33 (−1.25) −0.33 (−1.12)
Constant 1.20 (3.09)** 1.20 (na) 1.65 (5.80)** 1.65 (na)
R2 0.48 0.48 0.62 0.62
n 65 65 65 65
Note: **p < 0.01.
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Table 4. Results of OLS and node-level regression analysis for billable hours (t-values 
in parentheses).
Billable hours
Model 5 
conventional 
OLS
Model 6 
permutation 
OLS
Model 7 
conventional 
OLS
Model 8 
permutation 
OLS
Independent work role 0.43 (1.48) 0.43 (1.44) 0.62 (2.07)* 0.62 (2.07)*
Tenure 0.10 (0.69) 0.10 (0.72) 0.09 (0.65) 0.09 (0.73)
Female 0.09 (0.37) 0.09 (0.34) 0.10 (0.41) 0.10 (0.46)
Master’s degree 0.31 (1.05) 0.31 (0.89) 0.29 (0.92) 0.29 (0.80)
Inverse of Burt’s constraint −0.91 (−2.55)* −0.91 (−2.20)*
Independent × Inv. of Burt’s constraint 1.21 (3.06)** 1.21 (2.60)*
Betweenness centrality −0.25 (−1.67) −0.25 (−1.83)
Independent × Betweenness 0.32 (1.12) 0.32 (0.94)
Constant −0.34 (−0.86) −0.34 (na) −0.53 (−1.32) −0.53 (na)
R2 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14
n 65 65 65 65
Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
main effects of the inverse of Burt’s constraint and 
betweenness centrality and then their interactions 
with independent versus interdependent work role. 
According to the main effects of the brokerage 
measures in Models 1 to 4 in Table 3, brokerage is 
associated with higher scores for promoting new ideas. 
When examining the significant interaction effect of the 
work role in the Models 1 and 2 in Table 3, it is evident 
that employees in interdependent roles benefit from 
brokerage more than those in independent roles for 
promoting new ideas. For example in Models 1 and 2, 
the positive effect of the inverse of Burt’s constraint for 
interdependent work roles is 2.10 and for independent 
work roles, the effect is 2.08 −1.78 = 0.30.
Further, according to our hypothesis, for inde-
pendent work roles, brokerage should have less 
effect on role-prescribed performance than for 
interdependent roles. In Table 4, brokerage is modeled 
with billable hours, which is the role-prescribed 
performance measure for independent work roles. 
The main effects of Models 5 and 6 in Table 4 indicate 
that brokerage is negatively associated with billable 
hours. The interaction effect of the work role in 
Model 5 shows that the negative effect of the inverse 
of Burt’s constraint for interdependent work roles 
is −0.91 and for independent work roles, the effect 
is −0.90−1.21 = −2.11. This shows that higher brokerage 
is associated with lower role-prescribed performance 
for independent roles.
According to the main effects of the models 
presented in Tables 3 and 4, brokerage seems to be 
associated with higher performance in idea promotion 
and lower performance in billable hours, despite 
work role. However, in order to distinguish the work 
role-specific effects, further examination is needed. 
For this purpose, we examined the interactions by 
studying the simple slopes, which is a procedure 
in probing the interaction patterns (Dawson, 2014). 
After generating the significances of the simple 
slopes for interactions of the models with the inverse 
of Burt’s constraint and betweenness centrality 
for both promoting new ideas and billable hours 
(Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Tables 3 and 4) with Stata’s 
“margins” procedure (Table A1), we confirmed the 
hypothesis. For promoting new ideas, the coefficients 
of the simple slopes were statistically significant and 
positive for interdependent roles with both brokerage 
measures. Betweenness centrality was positive and 
significant also for independent roles, suggesting 
that brokerage is also associated with independent 
professionals in promoting their ideas. This was the 
case for the independent professionals in our study 
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who were not expected to promote new ideas, 
which was evident because 12 professionals out of 
31 received zero nominations as promoters of new 
ideas. Notably, for interdependent roles, brokerage is 
associated with lower number of billable hours.
Discussion
Our study adds knowledge on the relation of 
brokerage to performance and improves the empirical 
understanding of how formal organization is related 
to the informal. In our case organization, our finding 
is that brokerage is associated with higher role-
prescribed performance for those in interdependent 
roles, but not for those in independent roles. 
Therefore, our findings show that work role is a 
contingency, a boundary condition for brokerage. As 
brokers are bridging structurally distinct groups (Adler 
and Kwon, 2000; Burt, 1992, 1997; Reagans and 
McEvily, 2008), brokerage correlates with managerial 
performance in our empirical setting but does not 
have an association with independent professional’s 
performance measured with the amount of billable 
hours.
Theoretical contributions
By presenting work role as a boundary condition for 
brokerage, this paper makes several contributions to 
theory. First, the study complements earlier studies 
on the interplay of formal and informal organization 
(Biancani et al., 2014; Kleinbaum et al., 2013; Soda 
and Zaheer, 2012; Srivastava, 2015). Our results 
show that formal and informal structures reinforce 
each other, as proposed by McEvily et al. (2014) as 
one interaction mechanism between the formal and 
informal structures. Second, the study complements 
the contingency perspective on network theory. The 
network theory’s structuralist argument suggests 
a direct causal link from brokerage to performance 
(e.g. Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Mayhew, 1980), 
traditionally giving less attention to contingencies. 
This has probably led to underrepresentation of 
network studies taking moderators such as work 
roles into account, only with few exceptions (Ahuja 
et al., 2003; Brass, 1981; Burt, 1998; Ibarra and 
Andrews, 1993), and only quite recently, the individual 
attributes as contingencies have been consistently 
included in network studies (Landis, 2016).
Therefore, this study contributes to most brokerage 
literature that seems to imply that brokerage position 
benefits the broker, and sometimes but not always 
the network, all the time under all circumstances. Our 
study provides empirical evidence that suggests that 
it is in the role of managers to broker relations and 
communication among the horizontally and vertically 
differentiated units and employees for which they 
have responsibility. Our study suggests that formal 
work role not only greatly influences the performance 
targets, but also limits the advantage of brokerage 
to the behavior prescribed by the work role only for 
interdependent work roles.
The strength of our study is in its organization-
wide approach. We obtained network data from 
the entire population of employees in the firm with a 
particularly detailed survey questionnaire backed up 
with qualitative interviews. We separately surveyed 
giving-and-getting types of informal work-related 
communication ties enabling improved accuracy in 
examining brokerage. This so-called whole-network 
approach increases the validity of the brokerage 
measures used in the models (Borgatti et al., 
2018). The second strength of our study is that it 
measured the role-prescribed performance with 
objective performance data: independent work 
role’s performance with billable hours from the time 
sheets and interdependent role’s performance with 
peer evaluations of idea promotion. By doing so, 
we complement the studies that have connected 
organization-wide networks and work performance 
(Brass, 1981; Carboni and Ehrlich, 2013; Cross and 
Cummings, 2004; Mehra et al., 2001; Sparrowe et al., 
2001).
Limitations and future research
Despite its contributions, this study has several 
limitations providing motivation for further research. 
The first one concerns the case study character of 
our study. Our data were gathered from one firm, 
which limits the generalizability of the results. Yet, 
we were able to collect detailed survey, timesheet, 
and demographic data about the individuals working 
in the firm, resulting in organization-wide, bounded 
network data with the dependent variables that were 
meaningful proxies for performance. Confirming 
with the interviews and reviewing the self-reported 
job descriptions of professionals and supervisors, 
we concluded that the architect office seems like 
so many professional organizations, where work 
requires both high talent and extensive training, and 
where managers have professional backgrounds. 
The architects are regulated by a national regulatory 
agency with certification exams, and most of the 
individuals we studied were certified architects, 
thus the professional’s work in the firm was similar 
compared to firms in the same industry. The firm 
was well established in its market, and the employee 
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turnover was relatively low providing prerequisites for 
established communication network structures and 
divisions of labor between the work roles.
The second limitation is the reverse causality 
caused by common method variance, which is the 
usual limitation discussed in survey-based network 
studies (e.g. Carboni and Ehrlich, 2013; Sparrowe 
et al., 2001). We addressed common method variance 
by constructing our network variables from the first 
year of study and used the dependent variables 
from the second year. According to the assumptions 
of the structuralist approach of network theory, 
we assumed the causality of brokerage predicting 
performance in our research design. Our approach 
speaks to this causality, but as the communication 
network structures may take time to develop and 
become rigid, we are still left with a concern of 
reverse causality in which performance leads to 
structural advantage to some extent. This may be 
the case with the employees in interdependent roles, 
since brokerage was, as expected, associated with 
a higher idea promoter score, and promoters have 
a tendency to become central individuals (Obstfeld, 
2005; Scott, 2000), making our idea promoter 
DV actually a measure of prestige. Nevertheless, 
becoming prestigious in a professional organization 
arguably requires brokerage between others, so we 
are certain to have captured the right phenomenon 
with our measure of idea promotion.
The third limitation is related to alternative 
explanations on the mechanisms of why the nature of 
work role moderates brokerage. Our argumentation 
developed around Thompson’s (1967) idea of more 
independent roles (e.g. professional architects in our 
case) requiring less collaboration and coordination, thus 
benefiting less from brokerage is in line with previous 
research. However, differences in legitimacy between 
professional architects and managers would provide an 
alternative explanation for our hypothesis in our data. 
For example, Burt (1998) shows that women do not 
benefit from brokerage unless they have a more senior 
mentor as a sponsor, and argues that this effect is 
common for all low-status individuals in an organization 
(Burt and Merluzzi, 2014). High-status versus low-
status distinction is not entirely unrelated to the 
interdependent–independent distinction in our paper 
as the managers, on average, in our case firm have 
higher tenure and education levels than professional 
architects. However, nothing in our interviews and 
discussions in the company signaled to us about a 
possible legitimacy problem in the company.
The fourth limitation is related to our performance 
measures. Billable hours as a measure of pro fessional’s 
performance is uniform across all indi viduals, but 
the idea promotion score merits further examination. 
Superior evaluations have been the most commonly 
used across previous network studies, despite 
variation across superiors (Teigland and Wasko, 2009). 
Our peer evaluation method’s strongpoint is that it 
rules out the variance between different supervisors 
evaluating their subordinates. We considered peer 
evaluation meaningful, because the size of the firm 
was rather small, and everyone knew each other since 
they shared the same open office space.
Future research could extend the findings of this 
paper in numerous directions. One direction comes 
from the contribution of this paper suggesting the 
independent–interdependent work role as a boundary 
condition for brokerage. As brokerage theory has 
been applied to a wide range of work contexts, which 
might be argued to vary in terms of interdependence, 
the interdependence aspect has not been at the 
core of their research design implying that it should 
be equally well applicable to both. Moreover, most 
of the empirical evidence of benefits of brokerage up 
until now has been done exclusively with managers, 
therefore coming from the work that is fundamentally 
interdependent (e.g. chain managers or investment 
bankers). Further research would be needed to 
complement brokerage theory with work role point 
of view to clarify this specific boundary condition. 
Further research could also investigate more how 
status differences and legitimacy issues between 
individuals act as boundary conditions. For theorizing 
this stream of research, brokerage theory could benefit 
from hypotheses of status differences coming from 
evolutionary psychology and behavioral economics.
Management theory’s formal–informal aspects 
present another future research direction. An 
innovative approach would be to study the co-
existence and effectiveness of formal and informal 
structures with operationalizing formal structures not 
only as role hierarchies but also as workflow networks 
derived from project data and control for clearly 
work-related communication between superiors and 
employees. As most professional organizations are 
not as stratified as architectural firms, participating in 
the same project would serve as a proxy for formal 
structure. Novel data gathering methods about 
informal social structure could also be used. Since 
work-related communication is increasingly taking 
place digitally, communication data can be gathered 
from databases in addition to self-administered 
surveys. By analyzing the content of communication 
by text mining; for example, examining the content of 
e-mails individuals send each other, and dividing the 
content between formal and informal communication, 
would shed light on a multiplicity of relationships, 
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efficiency and innovativeness on a large scale, 
and answer the question as to how these network 
structures are associated with each other.
Managerial implications
In addition to the theoretical contributions, our 
study has implications for managers of professional 
organizations. According to the extant understanding 
in the managerial practice, successful organizations 
are both highly efficient in what they do and capable 
of adapting to changes. Typically, in professional 
organizations, professionals work primarily on tasks 
requiring specialized skills and competence, and 
managers work primarily in project management, 
sales, and offering development. Executives of 
professional organizations, at least in the most 
artistically and intellectually demanding kind, such 
as architecture, should therefore proceed with 
caution with the ideas of flattening formal hierarchies 
and divisions of labor in their organizations, in 
order to sustain simultaneous managerial capacity 
and professional performance. The finding that 
brokerage affords limited advantage to independent 
professionals suggests that, contrary to common 
belief, such people maybe should not invest a great 
deal of their time in networking and bridge building 
if that is not what their professional roles require. An 
informal organization in a professional organization 
can thus be seen as a mixture of independent 
professionals and interdependent managers. A 
successful firm balancing efficiency and adaptation 
is one that provides room for both independent and 
interdependent work roles and considers that not 
everyone should behave as brokers.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined how work role moderates 
the advantages of brokerage for role-prescribed 
performance. Our findings suggest that the 
advantage is contingent upon the work role and 
brokerage facilitates role-prescribed performance for 
individuals in interdependent roles but not for those in 
independent roles.
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Table A1. Simple slopes of the Models 1, 3, 5, and 7.
Delta method
dy/dx SE z P > |z| [95% conf. interval]
Promoting new ideas
Inv. of Burt’s constraint independent work role
 0 2.09692 60510 3.47 0.001 88567 3.30816
 1 0.31451 0.19970 1.57 0.121 −0.08523 0.71427
Betweenness centrality independent work role
 0 0.86236 0.14562 5.92 0.000 0.57087 1.15386
 1 0.53269 0.22076 2.41 0.019 0.09077 0.97460
Billable hours
Inv. of Burt’s constraint independent work role
 0 −0.90929 0.35692 −2.55 0.014 −1.62375 −0.19484
 1 0.30558 0.18013 1.70 0.095 −0.05499 0.66157
 Betweenness centrality independent work role
 0 −0.25708 0.15388 −1.67 0.100 −0.56511 0.05093
 1 0.06624 0.24507 0.27 0.788 −0.42432 0.55680
Note: Statistically significant slopes italicized.
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